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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
In the Interest of 
Elsie Johnson Black 
Emily Johnson Black 
Vaughn Johnson Black 
Ivan Francis Johnson Black 
Wilford Marshall Johnson Black 
Orson Johnson Black 
Lillian Johnson Black 
Spencer Leon Johnson Black, 
Alleged neglected, dependent children, 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELlANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8220 
This action was commenced upon petition of 
Jay R~ Hunts~~n, Probation Officer of Washington 
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County, Utah, to have the subject children de-
clared dependent, neglected children contrary to 
the provisions of the statutes of Utah. The 
matter was heard by the Juvenile Court of the 
Sixth District, in and for Washington County, 
State of Utah, before David F. Anderson, Judge, 
on March 20, 1954, and the subject children were 
adjudged and decreed on May 11, 1954, to be ne-
glected children within the meaning of the laws 
of Utah and the natural parents, Leonard Black 
and Vera Johnson, deprived of custody and control 
of the said children, and the said children made 
wards of the courto The custody and control of 
the children was awarded by the court to the Utah 
State Department of Public Welfare, but the chil-
dren were to be permitted to remain with their 
parents upon certain specific conditions. From 
this Decree and Judgment this appeal is taken upon 
all questions of law and facto 
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GTATENENT OF THE FACTS 
The Juvenile Court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, after hearing in 
this matter, to the effect that the subject child-
ren were neglected within the meaning of Section 
55-10-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that the 
parents of the children should be deprived of 
their custody and control, this conclusion being 
based on 19 findings of fact drawn to indicate 
that these children, who live with their mother 
in Short Creek, Utah, were not being provided with 
"the proper maintenance, care, training and educa-
tion contemplated and required by law and morals." 
The parents of these children are what is 
comrnonly known as Fundamentalist Mormons, accept-
ing as the Law of God the doctrine of Plural and 
Celestial Marriage as, in their sincere religious 
convictions, that doctrine was revealed and restor-
ed by God through his Prophet Joseph Smith in 
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Sec~ion 132 of Doctrine and Covenants of the Church 
of Jesus Christ ar Latter Day Saints. The commun-
ity in which they jive is essentially a pioneer-
ing farming cownunity on the Utah-Arizona border, 
the great majority of the residents of which hold 
to the same religious beliefs as do these parents. 
The Juvenile Court was unable to find any 
evidence that these children were being deprived 
of any of the essentials of life and, in 
fact, in Findings of Fact 16 specifically found 
"That there was no evidence that any of the chil-
dren were destitute and without proper sustenance, 
clothing or medical care." Nevertheless, the 
Juvenile Court concluded because af the religious 
beliefs of the parents and their neighbors that 
their home constituted an immoral enviornment for 
the rearing of the children, this despite the 
fact that these parents had ceased to cohabit as 
man and wife prior to the filing of the petition 
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in this matter. 
The children are all in good health, are 
being given all the educational opportunities 
available in the community, and are being raised 
by their parents in such a manner as to greatly 
enhance their prospects of becoming exemplary 
citizens of both state and nation. 
The Juvenile Court in its Decree and Judg-
ment, however, declared and adjudged these child-
ren to be neglected children within the meaning 
of the laws of Utah, depriving the parents of 
their right of custody and control of the chil-
dren, and made the children wards of the court. 
The court then awarded the right of custody 
and control of the children to the Utah State 
Dep~rtment of Public Welfare, authorizing the 
Department to place the children in suitable 
foster homes, but permitting the children to re-
main in the actual custody of their parents, 
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provided the parents would meet certain conditions. 
The conditions specified by the court would require 
the parents to submit a sworn statement to the 
following effect: That they would agree to com-
ply with the laws of Utah relating to marriage 
and sexual offenses; that they would refrain from 
counseling, encouraging and adv1sing their children 
to violate such laws, but would counsel and advise 
them to obey such laws and that they could satisfr 
this latter requirement not merely by "the pretense 
of telling the children that they have 'free agen-
cy', but it is intended that the parents shall af-
firmatively encourage their children to abide by 
the laws of Utah, and that the children should do 
so in disregard of any religious doctrines to the 
contrary"; that they would report to the probation 
officers with the children monthly, and that they 
would file a written sworn statement with the court 
each month of compliance with the court's require-
ments. 
6 
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The Juvenile Court further ordered in its 
Decree and Judgment that its judgment should not 
be stayed pending an appeal to this court, taking 
its authorization from Section 55-10-35, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
The parents of these children being unable, 
without violating their consciences, to file the 
oath demanded by the court, the children in due 
course were forcibly taken from their mother by 
the officers of the Juvenile Court and the De-
partment of Public Welfare and were placed in a 
home in Utah C~untyo 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANTS RELY 
Point 1. The Decree and Judgment is un-
constitutional and void in that subparagraph (f) 
of subparagraph 3 thereof requires the parents 
to swear that they are willing to comply with the 
requirements o~ subparagraph 3{a) through (e), 
7 
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which require the parents to report to the court 
once a month and file with the court each month 
an affidavit to the effect that they have complied 
with the laws of Utah relating to marriage and 
sexual offenses; that they have refrained from 
counseling, encouraging and advising the children 
to violate such laws; that they have counseled 
and advised the children to obey such laws not 
merely by telling the children that they have 
11free agency", "but it is intended that the 
parents shall affirmatively encourage their 
children to abide by the laws of Utah, and that 
the children should do so in disregard of any re-
ligious doctrines to the contrary," which require-
ments are contrary to the provisions of Sections 
1, 4 and 15 of Article 1 of the Constitution of 
Utah and Amendments 1 and 14 of the Constitution 
of the United States of America, in that said re-
quirements violate the constitutional guarantees 
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of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. 
Point 2. The Decree and Judgment operates 
to take the custody of children from their natural 
parents without due process .of law, the court hav-
ing no jurisdiction to enter the Decree and Judg-
ment which it has entered, all of which consti-
tutes the taking of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law in violation of the 
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America and Section 7 of Article I of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
Point 3. Section 55-10-35, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, under which the juvenile court 
in subparagraph 5 of its Decree and Judgment pur-
ports to act in stating that the execution of its 
judgment shall not be stayed pending an appeal, 
is unconstitutional if it can be invoked in a 
case like the case at bar, in that, it is a vio-
lation of due process of law and an overexten-
sion of the doctrine of parens patreae, under 
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which doctrine Juvenile Court statutes must be 
justified. 
Point 4e Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953, under which the Juvenile Court in 1. of 
its Conclusions of Law finds the children "neglect-
ed children" is unconstitutional, in that it is 
vague and uncertain. 
Point 5. The Findings of Fact 14, 17, 18 and 
19 are not supported by the evidence, and said Find-
ings of Fact being essential to the Conclusions 
of Law entered by the court, said Conclusions of 
Law are, therefore, not based upon the evidence 
before the court, and the Judgment and Decree 
based upon said Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law is, therefore, erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
Po:J.nt 1. The Decree and Judgment is un-
constitutional and void in that subparagraph (f) 
of subparagraph 3 thereof requires the parents 
10 
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to swear that they are willing to comply with the 
requirements of subparagraph 3(a) through le), 
which require the parents to report to the court 
once a month and file with the court each month 
an affidavit to the effect that they have complied 
with the laws of Utah relating to marriage and 
sexual offenses; that they have refrained from 
counseling, encouraging and advising the children 
to violate such laws; that they have counseled 
and advised the children to obey such laws not 
merely qy telling the children that they have 
"free agency", "but it is intended that the 
parents shall affirmatively encourage their 
children to abide by the laws of Utah, and that 
the children should do so in disregard of any re-
ligious doctrines to the contrary," which require-
ments are contrary to the provisions of Sections 
1, 4 and 15 of Article 1 of the Constitution of 
Utah and Amendments 1 and 14 of the Constitution 
of the United States of America, in that said re-
11 
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quirements violate the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. 
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Subparagraph 3 
of the Decree and Judgment of the Juvenile Court 
are as follows: 
"(b) That the narePts and each of them 
shall at all times r~fra.in from counseling, 
encouraging and advising the children to vio-
late the laws of Utah relating to marriage 
and sexual offenses. 
"(c) That the parents and each of them 
shall counsel and CA.dvise the children to obey 
the laws of Utah relating to marriage and 
sexual offenses. This requirement shall not 
be satisfied by the pretense of telling the 
children that they have 'free agency', but 
it is intended that the parents shall affirm-
atively encourage their children to abide 
by the laws of Utah, and that the children 
should do so in disregard of any religious 
doctrines to the contrary." 
Subsection (f) of subparagraph 3 of the said 
Decree and Judgment requires the parents to submit 
a sworn statement to the court of willingness to 
comply with its requirements as a condition to 
their retaining the actual custody of their children. 
The court is, in effect, saying to these parents 
12 
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and to the mother in particular, that in their 
own home they cannot teach their own religion to 
their own children. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States of America is as follows: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of re~igion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances." 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States of 
America is, in part, as follows: 
11 
••• No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to r:.r~y 
person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
The pertinent portions of the Article 1 of 
the Constitution of Utah are as follows: 
SECTION I 
"All men have the inherent and inalien-
13 
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able right to enjoy and defend their lives 
and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates 
of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for re-
dress of grievances; to communicate freely 
their thoughts and opinions, being responsi-
ble for the abuse of that right. 
SECTION 4 
"The rights of conscience shall never 
be infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall Qe required as a quali-
ficatio~ for any office of public trust or 
for anv vote at any election; nor shall any 
person be incompetent as a witness or juror 
on account of religious belief or the absence 
thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall any Church dominate the 
State or interfere with its functions. No 
public money or property shall be appropriat-
ed for or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or for the support 
of any ecclesiastical establishment. No pro-
perty qm~lification shall be required of any 
person to vote, or hold office, except as 
provided in this Constitution. 
SECTION 15 
"No law shall be passed to abridge or 
restrain the freedom of speech or of the press ••• " 
The right of people to be free of governmental 
interference in their own homes has long been rec-
ognized in English and American jurisprudence. 
14 
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Lord Coke's maxim in Semayne's case is an example: 
"The house of every one is to him as his castle 
and forttess, as well for his defense as for his 
repose." It is well to note also the words of 
the elder Pitt in his speech on the Excise: "The 
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to 
all the force of the Crown. It may be frail; its 
roof may shake; the wind may enter - but the King 
of England cannot enter. All his forces dare not 
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." 
The Juvenile Cour~ in this matter seeks to 
enter the home these parents provide for their 
children and to force the parents to tell their 
children that what they conscientiously believe 
to be the word of God should be disregarded by 
these children. This would seem to be a novel 
concept of the powers of American Courts, for 
diligent search does not reveal a case in which 
the courts have attempted to exercise such author-
ity, and it ··is inconceivable that had any court 
15 
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so acted its action would not have been challenged 
by appeal to higher tribunalso 
The higher courts have not had too great an 
occasion to deal with decisions or lower courts 
which go so far as to declare, in effect, what is 
a right or a wrong belief in God, as does the 
Juvenile Court in this case, but when called upon 
to do so they have been quick to say that such 
is not the province of the courts. 
Ann. Cas. 1914A., at pages 752 and 753 quotes 
from In re DOYLE, 16 Moo Appo 159, with reference 
to the right of a parent to teach his religion to 
his children and the power of the courts to take 
· their custody from him for such teaching, as follows: 
"A great deal has been said in the ar-
gument as to the religious question. In 
determining what will be best for the child, 
we cannot, under the system of law we are 
appointed to administ~r, look at that. The 
state or which we are citizens and officers 
does not regard herself as having any compe-
tenc.y in spiritual matterso She looks with 
equal eye upon all forms of so-called Christ-
ianity and subjects no one to any disability 
for rejecting the generally accepted doctrines 
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of natural religion. A father in Missouri 
forfeits no right to the custody and control 
of his child by being, or becoming, an atheist, 
nor are his rights in this respect increased 
before the law by his behaving rightlyo The 
law does not profess to know what is a right 
belief ••• It is manifest that anything which 
interferes with the natural right of the 
father to direct the religious education 
of his child strikes a blow at the family, 
which, in the last analysis, is the found-
ation of the state. Few men would be will-
ing to assume the burdens of a legal patern-
ity, if they supposed that their children 
could, against their will, be taken from 
them to be educated in religious systems 
which they believed to be false, and to be 
taugh+ thus to despise their father for his 
superstition, or for his infidelity, as the 
case might be. To thP. Protestant, the 
Catholic religion must be a system of super-
stition; to the Jew, it must be one of im-
posture, and to the unbeliever, the old 
historic religions of the Jew and the Catho-
lic, and the various sects of Protestantism, 
are alike false, and the profession of any 
of them a confession, so far, of moral or 
intellectual weakness. I can conceive no 
more poignant anguish than that of the true 
father who sees his child, against his will, 
brought up before his eyes in a religious 
system which he abhors, as being, according 
to his belief, injurious to the spiritual 
interests of his child; and, if he believes 
sincerely in any form of religion, his an-
guish at seeing his child brought up in re-
ligious indifferentism cannot be less ••• " 
The record in this case is replete with references 
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to the religious beliefs or the people involved. 
Mr. Knowlton in his statement to the court at the 
beginning of the hearing on page 3 of the trans-
cript of the testimony said ". • • Mr. Black, and 
his entire family had accepted as true the 132nd 
Section of the DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS of the L.D.S. 
Church ••• " Much of the testimony at the hearing 
revolved around the religious beliefs of the par-
ents and the children and the likelihood of the 
children following those beliefs in violation of 
Utah statutes. 
In UNITED STATES v. BARLOW 56 FoSupp. 795 
(1944), to be discussed more fully below, the 
court was dealing with a matter involving people 
who professed the same faith in God as do the 
people who were before the Juvenile Court in 
this caseo On page 796 of the report the court 
sets out an editorial from TRUTH MAGAZINE which 
substantially sets out that faith, at least in 
so far as it differs with the faith of the mod-
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ern Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 
The editorial as quoted by the court is, as follO\-rs: 
"'The Lord restored the principle of 
Celestial or plural marriage in line with 
his promise that in this the last dispensa-
tion there would be a restoration of all 
things and -4-,ha t there should be no taking 
away again. Plural marriage is one of the 
laws of Heaven that has been restored never 
again to be taken from the earth or given 
to another people. It is a law that cannot 
be abrogated, modified or postponed. The 
hackneyed claim that the Woodruff Manifesto 
of 1890 was given by revelation from the 
Lord to abrogate His law of Plural Marriage 
has been exploited by the leaders to a 
shocking degree, and as often has been ex-
plodedo Any person with 8th grade intelli-
gence reading the Manifesto will discover 
nothing in it savoring of revelation, or 
as an injunction from the Lord against the 
continued practice of the principle. True, 
the subsequent interpretation given it by 
Wilford Woodruff, while under pressure by 
the enemy, and so far as it was ratified by 
the Church, bound the Church to a monagamic 
marriage system. But it was the Church that 
was bound, and not God~" 
What the Decree and Judgment of the Juvenile 
Court does, in effect, is to say that these things 
may not be taught by these parents to these chil-
dren. This is nothing more than the court saying 
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that the position of one faction is correct and 
that of the other faction is wrong. American 
courts are not called upon to arbitrate these 
matters. This question was considered by the 
court in GLOVER v~ BAKER, 67 N.H. 393, 83 A. 916 
(1912). The case concerned the validity of a 
trust set up by the will of Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy, 
the founder of the Christian Science religion. 
Chief Justice Parsons dealt with the matter of 
courts concerning themselves with the truth of a 
particular faith on p. 932 A, as follows: 
"With the truth of the religious theories 
inculcated the court has no concern. Even if, 
upon examination of Mrs. Eddy's writings, the 
me~bers of thP court should entertain the 
opinion expressed by Sir John Romilly of 
Joanna Southcate in Thornton v. Howe, and be-
lieve her to be 'a foolish, ignorant woman', 
and her teachings absurd and illogical de-
lusions, the personal opinions of the members 
of the court would not affect the question. 
Mrs. Eddy had the conAtitutional right to en-
tertain such opinions as she chose, to make a 
religion of them, and to teach them to all 
others; and their rights of belief are as ex-
tensive as hers ••• Whether her opinions are 
theologically true 1the courts are not cam-
P etent to decide. • u 
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Another case which took up this matter was 
KNOWLTON v. BAUMHAVER, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N. W. 
202 (1918). The case involved the question of 
sectarian teaching in the public schools. The 
court held that sectarian teaching must be kept 
out of the public schools. In considering court 
interference with religion the court quoted, at 
page 208 N.W., the following from Board v. Minor, 
23 Ohio St. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 233: 
rttTrue Christianity asks no aid from the 
sword of civil authority. It began without 
the sword, and wherever it has taken the 
sword it has perished by the sword. To de-
pend on civil authority for its enforcement 
is to acknowledge its own weakness, which 
it can never afford to do. It is able to 
fight its own battleso Its weapons are 
moral and spiritual and not carnal •••••• 
True Christianity is a solecism, a contra-
diction of terms. When Christianity asks 
the aid of government beyond mere impartial 
protection, it denies itself •••• The state 
can have no religious opinions; and if it 
undertakes to enforce the teaching of such 
opinions, they must be the opinions of some 
natural person, or class of persons. If 
it embarks in this business, whose opinion 
shall it adopt? ••• Let the state not only 
keep its hands off, but let it also see to 
it that religious sects keep their hands 
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off each other. Let religious doctrines have 
a fair field, and a free, intellectual, moral, 
and spiritual conflict. The weakest,-that is, 
the intellectually, morally, and spiritually 
weakest- will go to the wall, and the best 
will triumph in the end. This is the golden 
truth which it has taken the world 18 centuries 
to learn and which has at last solved the 
terrible enigma of 'church and state' •••• The 
state will impartially aid all parties in 
their struggles after religious truth, by 
providing means for the increase of general 
knowledge, which is the handmaid of good govern-
ment, as well as of true religion and moral-
ity. It means that a man's right to his own 
religious conviction and to impa:rt them to 
his own children, and his and their right 
to engage in harmless acts of worship to-
ward the Almighty, are as sacred in the eyes 
of the law as his rights of person or prop-
erty, and that, although in the minority, he 
shall be protected in the full and unrestrict-
ed enjoyment thereof. '" 
The position of governments with respect to 
religion is considered in ILLINOIS ex rel MCCOLLUM 
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ctc 461, 
92 L.Ed. (Adv. 451), 2 A.L.R. 1338 (1948). The 
case dealt with the use of public school property 
for religious instruction and held such use un-
constitutional. Justice Black in his opinion in 
A.LoR., p. 1347, quoted from Everson v. Board of 
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Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 s.ct. 504, as follows: 
"'Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over an-
othero Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a 
belief or disbelief in any religion. No 
person can be punished for entertaining or 
for professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-attendance. No 
tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities 
or institutions, whatever they may be called, 
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or 
practice religion. Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa. In 
the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion was intended to 
erect 'a wall of separation between church 
and State."' 
The issue is dealt with in COOLEY ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIHITATIONS 7th Ed., P• 663, et seq., 
nThose things which are not lawful under any of 
the American constitutions may be stated thus:-
"1. Any law respecting an establishment 
of religion. The legislatures have not been 
left at liberty to effect a union of Church 
and State, or to establish preferences by 
law in favor of any one religious persuasion 
or mode of worship. There is not complete 
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religious liberty where any one sect is 
favored by the State and given ~jvantage 
by law over other sects. Wha\,'3V3r estab-
lishes a distinction against one class or sect 
is, to the extent to which the disti~ction 
operates unfavorable, a persecution; and if 
based on religious grounds, a religious per-
secution. The extent of the discrimination 
is not material to the principle; it is enough 
that it creates an inequality of right or 
privilege ••• 
"4. Restraints upon the free exercise 
of religion according to the dictates of the 
conscience. No external authority is to place 
itself between the finite being and the Infinite 
when the former is seeking to render the hom-
age that is due, and in a mode which commends 
itself to his conscience and judgment as being 
suitable for him to render, and acceptable 
to its object-_ 
"5. Restraints upon the expression of 
religious belief. An earnest believer usually 
regards it as his duty to propagate his opin-
ions, and to bring others to his views. To 
deprive him of this right is to take from him 
the power to perform what he considers a most 
sacred obligation ••• " 
And on p. •673 
"The constitutional provisions for the 
protection of religious liberty not only in-
clude vri thin their protecting power all senti-
ments and professions concerning or upon the 
subject of religion, but they guarantee to 
everyone a perfect right to form and to promul-
gate such opinions and doctrines upon religious 
matters, and in relation to the existence, power, 
attributes, and providence of a Supreme Being as 
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to himself shall seem reasonable a:nd correct. 
In doing this he acts under an awful responsi-
bility, but it is not to any human tribunal." 
And on p. 676, 
"Whatever deference the constitution or 
the laws may require to be paid in some cases 
to the conscientitous scruples or religious 
convictions of the majority, the general 
policy always is, to avoid with care any com-
pulsion which infringes on the religious 
scruples of any, however little reason may 
seem to others to underlie them ••• " 
The broad nature of these guarantees is con-
sidered by the Massachusetts Court in GLASER v. 
CONGREGATION 1\..EHILIATH ISRAEL, 263 Mass. 435, 
161 N.E. 619, (1928). In speaking of the pro-
tection of religious liberties by the Massachusetts 
Constitution on p. 620 N. E., the court said, 
"These great guarantees of religious 
liberty and equality before the law of all 
religions are not confined to adherents of 
the Christian religion or to societies and 
corporations organized for the promotion of 
Christianity. They extend likewise to the 
adherents of the ancient religion whose sacred 
scriptures form a part of the Bible. We are 
of the opinion that Jew as well as Christians 
are protected by these explicit declarations 
of religious equality ••• 11 
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In STATE v. LEVIN, 109 N. J. Law. 503, 
162 A. 909 (1932), the Court, in dealing with 
the right of witnesses to testify where they re-
fused because of conscientious scruples to take 
an oath, being atheists, said, on Page 912A., 
"We consider that the constitutional 
provision is a direction that the belief 
or the disbelief of any person on religious 
topics shall not debar him from rights which 
the law affords to others." 
In MACINTOSH v. UNITED STATES, 42 F. (2d) 845, 
(1930), the court held that citizenship was im-
properly denied an applicant who was a conscien-
ti6us objector to bearing arms. Judge Manton dis-
cusses the rights of individuals to worship God 
unmolested on page 848, as follows: 
"··· Story in his work on the Constitu-
tion, vel. II ~ 1876, says, 'The rights of 
conscience are, indeed, beyond the just 
reach of any human power. They are given by 
God and cannot be encroached upon by human 
authority, without a criminal disobedience 
of the precepts of natural, as well as re-
vealed religion'. The rights of conscience 
are unalienable, which the citizen need not 
surrender and which the government or society 
cannot taKe away. 
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"'Every individual has a natural and 
unalienable right to worship God, according 
to the dictates of his own conscience and 
reason'; and it is also his 'natural and un-
alienable right' not to be 'hurt, molested, 
or restrained in his person, liberty, or es-
tate for worshiping God in the manner and 
season most agreeable to the dictates of his 
own conscience, or for his religious pro-
fession, sentiments or persuasion', provided 
he does not disturb others.' Hale v. Everett, 
53 N. H. 9, 6o, 16 Am. Rep. 82. " 
Another case considering the scope of the 
freedom is U,:WIS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NEW YORK 
CITY, 285 N.Y.S. 164 (1935). In a case involving 
the reading from the Bible in the public schools, 
in speaking of religious freedom, at page 169 the 
court says, 
"The sanctified principle of freedom of 
religious belief does not distinguish between 
believers and nonbelievers. It embraces both 
and accords one as much protection and freedom 
as the other. A sect or tenet which is in-
tolerant of those of a different sect or tenet 
is the precise antithesis of religious liberty. 
Freedom is negated if it does not comprehend 
freedom for ·those who believe as well as those 
who disbelieve. The law is astute and zealous 
in seeing to it that all religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs are to be given unfettered ex-
pression. Authentic free thinking involves 
the indubitable right to believe in God, as 
well as the unfettered license not to believe 
or to disbelieve in a Diety." 
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These authorities indicate that the courts 
of this country should never place themselves, 
directly or indirectly in the position of favor-
ing one creed over another. The decision of the 
Juvenile Court places it squarely in a position 
of favoring the teaching of the creed of the 
modern Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints as opposed to the teaching of Fundamental 
Mormonism with respect to the truth of the 132nd 
Section of the DOCTRDm AND COVENANTS of the 
L. D. S. Church. If these parents were required 
to teach their children as demanded by the 
Juvenile Court in this case, the effect of such 
teaching would be that these parents would have 
to teach their children a religious doctrine re-
pugnant to their own beliefs and which contra-
venes their faith in God. 
The requirement that these parents take an 
oath is a requirement that they do an act. The 
oath which the Juvenile Court would require these 
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parents to take would require them to teach some-
thing which contravenes their faith in God. This 
amounts to requiring these parents to do an act 
which contravenes their faith in God under pain 
of losing custody of their children if they do not 
do the act. Such a requirement no American court 
is empowered to make. An excellent case on this 
point and on the freedoms of speech and religion 
handed down in recent years is WEST VIRGINIA 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. WALTER BARNETT, 
319 u.s. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943). The facts 
in the case were these: The West Virginia legis-
lature, Sect. 1734 W. Va. Code (1941 Supp.), by 
valid act approved by the Governor and thus made 
law, gave the state board of education the power 
and duty to prescribe courses of study in the 
schools with reference to U • S. history and ci vies 
and in the Constitution of the United States and 
of the State of West Virginia. In pursuance of 
such statute the School Board of West Virginia 
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by otherwise valid resolution required all school 
children to salute the United States Flag and to 
take the pledge of allegiance. The penalty for 
refusal, under grounds that such refusal was in-
subordination was dismissal from school. Read-
mission was denied by statute, Section 1851 (1) 
W. Va. Code (1941 Supp.) until compliance. In 
the meantime the expelled child is "unlawfully 
absent" under said Section 1851, and may be pro-
ceeded against as a delinquent under Sec. 4904 
(4) W. Va. Code (1941 Supp.). His parents or 
guardians are liable to prosecution under § 1851, 
supra, and if convicted are subject to fine not 
exceeding $50.00 and a jail term not exceeding 
30 days under § 1851, supra. The United States 
Supreme Court looked upon the combination of 
school board rulings and statutes as giving the 
order of the school board the force of law. 
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Board to 
restrain the enforcement of these laws 
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and resolutions against Jehovah's Witnesses on 
the ground that members of such faith look upon 
the flag as a •graven image" and are enjoined by 
Exodus, Chapter 20, Verses 4 and 5 from bowing 
down to such or serving the same. Some of the 
Plaintiffs' Children were expelled from school, 
others threatened with expulsion and by proper 
officials threatened with being sent to reforma-
tories for criminally inclined juveniles. The 
parents were prosecuted and threatened with 
prosecutions for causing delinquency. 
The Board moved for dismissal of the com-
plaint denying any infringement of constitutional 
guarantees to these Plaintiffs. The United 
States District Court restrained the Board, which 
Board then took a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
The holding in the case was essentially that 
the Board requirements amounted to a-compulsion 
of students to declare a belief contrary to their 
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religious convictions and such a requirement con-
stitutes a violation of religious freedom as con-
tained in the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States of America. The court 
affirmed the judgment below. 
The majority opinion written qy Justice 
Jackson is, in part, as follows: 
"The freedom asserted by these appellees 
does not bring them into conflicts which most 
frequently require intervention of the State 
to determine where the rights of one end and 
those of another tegin. But the refusal of 
these persons to participate in the ceremony 
does not interfere or deny rights of others 
to do so. Nor is there any question in this 
case that their behavior is peaceable and 
orderly. The sole conflict is between 
authority and rights of the individual. 
" ••• The State asserts power to condition 
access to public education on making a pre-
scribed sign and profession and at the same 
time to coerce attendance by punishing both 
parent and child. The latter stand on a 
right of self-determination in matters that 
touch individual opinion and personal attitude. 
11 Here, however, we are dealing with a 
compulsion of students to declare a belief. 
They are not merely made acquainted with the 
flag salute so that they may be informed as 
to what it is or even what it means ••• 
" ••• The issue here is whether this slow 
and easily neglected route to arouse loyalties 
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constitutionally may be short-cut by substi-
tuting a compulsory salute and slogan ••• 
"Here it is the State that employs a 
flag as a symbol of adherence. to government 
as presently organized. It required the 
individual to communicate by word and sign 
his acceptance of the political ideas it thus 
bespeaks. Objection to this form of com-
munication when coerced is an old one, well 
known to the fr.amers of the Bill of Rights ••• 
"It is also noted that the compulsory 
flag salute and pledge requires affirmation 
of a belief and an attitude of mind... It 
is now a common-place that censorship or 
suppression of opinion is tolerated by our 
constitution only when the expression pre-
sents a clear and present danger of action 
of a kind the State is empowered to prevent 
and punish ••• To sustain the compulsory 
flag salute we are required to say that a 
Bill of Rights which guards the individual's 
right to speak his own mind, left it open 
to public authorities to compel him to utter 
what is not in his mind ••• 
"Government of limited power need not be 
anemic government. Assurance that rights 
are secure tends to diminish fear and 
jealousy of strong government, and by making 
us feel safe to live under it makes for its 
better support. Without promise of a limit-
ing bill of rights it is doubtful if our 
Constitution could have mustered enough 
strength to enable its ratification. To 
enforce those rights today is not to choose 
weak government over strong government. It 
is only to adhere as a means of strength of 
individual freedom of mind in preference to 
officially disciplined uniformity for which 
history indicates a disappointing and 
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disastrous end ••• 
"Observation of the limitations of the 
Constitution will not weaken government in 
the field appropriate for its exercise ••• 
"There are village tyrants as well as 
village Hampdens, but none who acts under 
color of law is beyond reach of the Consti-
tution." 
(Speaking of the courts' duty to apply 
the Bill of Rights): "We must transplant 
these rights to a soil in which the laisses-
faire concept or principle of non-interfer-
ence has withered at least to economic 
affairs, and social advancements are in-
creasingly sought through closer integration 
of society and through expanded and strength-
ened government controls. These changed 
conditions often deprive precedents of 
reliability and cast us more than we would 
choose upon our own judgment. But we act 
in these matters not by authority of our 
competence but by force of our commissions. 
Ye cannot, because of modest estimates of 
our competence in such specialties as public 
education, withhold the judgment that history 
authenticates as the function of this court 
when liberty is infringed .. " 
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of 
sentiment in support of some end thought 
essential to their time and country have 
been waged qy many good as well as evil 
men. Nationalism is a relatively recent 
phenomenon but at other times and places 
the ends have been racial or territorial 
security, support of a dynasty or regime, 
and particular plans for saving souls. As 
governmental pressure to~~rd unity becomes 
greater, so strife becomes more bitter as 
to whose unity it shall be. Pro ba. bly no 
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deeper division' of our people could proceed 
from any provocation than from finding it 
necessary to choose what doctrine and whose 
program public educational officials shall 
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate 
futility of such attempts to compel coherence 
is the lesson of every such effort from the 
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a 
disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition 
as a means to religious and dynastic unity, 
the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian 
unity, down to the fast-failing efforts of 
our totalitarian enemies. Those who begin 
coercive elimination of dissent soon find 
themselves exterminating dissenters. Com-
pulsory unification of opinion achieves 
only the ananimity of the graveyard." 
"It seems trite but necessary to say 
that the First Amendment to our Constitution 
was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding 
these beginnings. There is no mysticism in 
the American concept of the State or the 
nature of the origin of its authority. We 
set up government by consent of the governed, 
and the Bill of Rights denies those in power 
any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. 
Authority here is controlled by public opin-
ion, not public opinion qy authority. 
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights 
was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to 
place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts. 
One's right to life, liberty, and property, 
to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental 
rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections.u 
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". eoNevertheless, we apply the limita-
tions of the Constitution with no fear that 
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually 
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate 
the social organization ••• We can have in-
tellectual individualism and rich cultural 
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds 
only at the price of occasional eccentricity 
and abnormal attitudes. When they are so 
harmless to others or to the State as those 
we deal with here, the price is not too 
great. But freedom to differ is not limited 
to things that do not matter much. That 
would be a mere shadow of freedomo The test 
of its substance is the right to differ as 
to things that touch the heart of the 
existing order. 
ttif there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein. If there are any 
circumstances which permit an exception, 
they do not now occur to us.n 
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in an 
opinion in which they stated: 
"Words uttered under coercion are 
proof of loyalty to nothing, but self inter-
est. Love of country must spring from will-
ing hearts and free minds, inspired by a 
fair administration of wise laws enacted qy 
the people's elected representatives within 
the bounds of express constitutional pro-
hibitions. These laws must, to be consistent 
with the First Amendment, permit the widest 
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toleration of conflicting viev~oints con-
sistent with a society of free men." 
Justice Murphy also concurred stating: 
" ••• But there is before us the right 
of freedom to believe, freedom to worship 
one's Maker according to the dictates of 
one's conscience, a right which the consti-
tution specifically shelters. Reflection 
has convinced me that as a judge I have no 
loftier duty or responsibility than to up-
hold that spiritual freedom to its farthest 
reaches. 
"The right of freedom of thought and of 
religion as guaranteed by the Constitution 
against State action includes both the right 
to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all, except in so far as 
essential operations of government may re-
quire it for the preservation of an orderly 
society--as in the case of compulsion to give 
evidence in court ••••• Official compulsion 
to affirm what is contrary to one's reli-
gious beliefs is the antithesis of freedom 
of worship which, it is well to recall, was 
achieved in this country only after what 
Jefferson characterized as the 'severest con-
tests in which I have ever been engaged' ••• 
"The trenchant words in the preamble 
to the Virginia Statute for Religious Free-
dom remain unanswerable: 'All attempts to 
influence (the mind) by temporal punishments, 
or burdens, or civil incapacitations, tend 
only to beget habits of hypocricy and 
meanness.' •••• 
" ••• It is in that freedom and the example 
of persuasion, not in force and compulsion 
that the real unity of America lies." 
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In dissenting Justice Frankfurter had this 
to say about oath tests: 
"The flag salute exercise has no kinship 
whatever to the oath tests so odious in 
history. For the oath test was one of the 
instruments for suppressing heretical be-
liefs. Saluting the flag suppresses no 
belief or curbs it. Children and their 
parents may believe what they please, avow 
their belief and practice it. It is not 
even remotely suggested that the require-
ment for saluting the flag involves the 
slightest restriction against the fullest 
opportunity on the part both of the the 
children and of their parents to disavow 
as publicly as they choose to do so that 
others attach to the gesture of salute. 
All channels of affirmative free expression 
are open to both children and parents. Had 
we before us any act of the State putting 
the slightest curbs upon such free expres-
sion, I should not lag behind any member of 
this Court in striking down such an invasion 
of the right of freedom of thought and free-
dom of speech protected by the Constitution." 
Mr. Justice Hurphy in his dissent in PRINCE 
v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 321 U.S. 158, 
64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944) had this to 
say about religious freedom: 
"No chapter in human history has been 
so largely written in terms of persecution 
and intolerance as the one dealing with 
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religious freedom. From ancient times to 
the present day, the ingenuity of man has 
known no limits in its ability to forge 
weapons of oppression for use against those 
who dare to express or practice unorthodox 
religious beliefs. And the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses are living proofs of the fact that 
even in this nation, conceived as it was in 
the ideals of freedom, the right to practice 
religion in unconventional ways is still far 
from secure~ Theirs is a militant and un-
popular faith, pursued with a fanatical 
zeal. They have suffered brutal beatings; 
their property has been destroyed; they 
have been harassed at every turn by the 
resurrection and enforcement of little used 
ordinances and statutes ••• To them, along 
with other present-day religious minorities, 
befalls the burden of testing our devotion 
to the ideals and constitutional guarantees 
of religious freedom. We should therefore 
hesitate before approving the application 
of a statute that might be used as another 
instrument of oppression. Religious free-
dom is too sacred a right to be restricted 
or prohibited in any degree without con-
vincing proof that a legitimate interest 
of the state is in grave danger .. " 
A point of grave importance in the instant 
matter is whether a point has been reached under 
the facts presented to the Juvenile Court which 
would justify the State through its courts in 
intervening. 
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The justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States had occasion to consider this mat-
ter in a case which came to the court from this 
State involving this same teaching as is now be-
fore the court. In MUSSER v. UTAH, 333 U.S. 95, 
68 s. ct. 397, 92 L. Ed. 562 (1948), the court 
sent back to the Utah Supreme Court for statutory 
construction a conspiracy conviction under 
Section 103-11-1 (5) Utah Code Anno., 1943, which, 
the court said "so far as relevant, defines con-
spiracy: (5) to commit any act injurious to the 
public health, the public morals or to trade or 
commerce or for the perversion or obstruction of 
justice or the due administration of the laws ••• '" 
Mr. Justice Jackson in the opinion of the 
court at page 565 L. Ed., said, 
"It is obvious that this is no narrowly 
drawn statute. We do not presume to give 
an interpretation as to what it may include. 
Standing by itself, it would seem to be war-
rant for conviction any act which a judge 
and jury might find at the moment contrary 
to his or its notion of what was good for 
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health, morals, trade, commerce, justice or 
order. In some states the phrase 'injurious 
to public morals' would be likely to punish 
acts which it would not punish in others be-
cause of the varying policies on such matters 
as use of cigarettes or liquor and the per-
missibility of gambling. This led to the 
inquiry as to whether the statute attempts 
to cover so much that it effectively covers 
nothing •••• " 
Justice Black concurred in the result. 
Justice Rutledge dissented in opinion joined 
in by Justices Douglas and Murphy. 
P. 567, 568 "···The Utah statute was con-
strued. to proscribe any agreement to advo-
cate the practice of polygamy. Thus the 
line was drawn between discussion and 
advocacy. 
"The Constitution requires that the 
statute oo lim±t·ed more narrowly. At the 
very least the line must be drawn between 
advocacy and incitement, and even the state's 
power to punish incitement may vary with the 
nature of the speech, whether persuasive or 
coercive, the nature of the wrong induced, 
whether violent or merely offensive to the 
mores, and the degree of probability that 
the substantive evil will result. See 
Bridges v. California, 314 U. s. 252, 262, 
263, 86 L. Ed. 192,202,203, 62 S. Ct. 190, 
159 ALR 1346. 
"It is axiomatic that a democratic state 
may not deny its citizens the right to criti-
cise existing laws and urge that they be 
changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an 
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effort to legalize polygamy it is obviously 
necessary to convince a substantial number of 
people that such conduct is desirable. But 
conviction that the practice is desirable 
has a natural tendency to induce the practice 
itself. Thus, depending on where the cir-
cular reasoning is started, the advocacy of 
polygamy may either be unlawful as inducing 
a violation of the law, or be constitutional-
ly protected as essential to the proper 
functioning of the democratic process. 
"In the abstract the problem could be 
solved in various ways. At one extreme it 
could be said that society can best protect 
itself by prohibiting the substantive evil 
and relying on a completely free interchange 
of ideas as the best safeguard against de-
moralizing propaganda. Or we might permit 
advocacy of lawbreaking, but only so long as 
the advocacy fall short of incitement. But 
the other extreme position, that the state 
may prevent any conduct which induces people 
to violate the law, or any advocacy of un-
lawful activity, cannot be squared with the 
First Amendment. At the very least, as we 
have indicated, under the clear-and-present-
danger rule, the second alternative stated 
marks the limit of the state's power as re-
stricted by the Amendment. 11 
Justice Rutledge cited in note 7 the follow-
ing exerpt from a letter by Thomas Jefferson to 
Elijah Boardman: 
"We have nothing to fear from the de-
moralizing reasonings of some, if others are 
left free to demonstrate their errors and 
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especially when the law stands ready to pun-
ish the first criminal act produced by false 
reasonings; these are safer corrections than 
the conscience of a judge." 
And in note 8 he quotes from Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. Calfiornia, 
274 U.S.357, at 376, 71 L. Ed. at 1095, 47 S. Ct. 
641, at follows: 
"But even advocacy of violation, however 
reprehensible morally, is not a justification 
for denying free speech where the advocacy 
falls short of incitement and there is noth-
ing to indicate that the advocacy would be 
immediately acted on.n 
There can be no "clear and present dangern 
here. These children are not ready for marriage. 
Even the oldest son nowhere indicates a present in-
tention of marrying and certainly the court makes 
no finding to the effect that he immediately intends 
marriage. These children are not being told to vio-
late the law; they are being taught what their par-
ents believe to be the word of God handed down in 
Revelation through the hand of His Prophet Joseph 
Smith. The clear-and-present-danger rule implies 
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that the danger must be vastly more imminent than 
that shown by the facts before the Juvenile Court. 
What it means with reference to the curtailment of 
speech in the United States may be seen by referring 
to a dissenting opinion in ABRA~~ v. UNITED STATES, 
250 U.S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919). The Supreme 
Court affirmed a conviction under the Espionage 
Act. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote an eloquent dissent 
with reference to free speech. It is, in part, as 
follows: 
"Persecution for the expression of opin-
ions seems to me to be perfectly logical. If 
you have no doubt of your premise or your 
power, and want a certain result with all your 
heart, you naturally express your wishes in 
law and sweep away all opposition. To allow 
opposition by speech seems to indicate that 
you think the speech impotent, as when a man 
says that he has squared the circle, or that 
you do not care wholeheartedly for the re-
sult, or that you doubt either your power or 
premises. But when men have realized that 
time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they be-
lieve the very foundations of their own 
conduct, that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas - that 
the best test of truth is the povrer of the 
thought to get itself accept~d in the com-
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petition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can 
be carried out. That, at any rate, is the 
theory of our Constitution. It is an experi-
ment, as all life is an experiment. Every 
y~ar, if not every day, we have to wager our 
salvation upon some prophecy based upon im-
perfect knowledge. While that experiment is 
part of our system, I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check 
the expression of opinions that we loath and 
believe to be fraught with death, unless they 
so imminently threaten immediate interference 
with the lawful and pressing purposes of law 
that an immediate check is required to save 
the country •••• Only the emergency that makes 
it immediately dangerous to leave the correct-
ion of evil counsels to time warrants making 
any exception to the sweeping co~mand, 'Con-
gress shall make no law abridging the freedom 
of speech' ••• I regret that I cannot put into 
more impressive words my belief that in their 
conviction upon this indictment the defend-
ants were deprived of their rights under the 
Constitution of the United States." 
The criminal statutes of this State and the 
powers of its courts to enforce them are quite 
sufficient to handle the matter of violations of 
the criminal law when they occur. In the case 
before the court it would seem that the Juvenile 
Court of Washington County is seeking to reach 
out and punish these parents qy taking away the 
custody of their children for a possible future 
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violation of the law by those children which vio-
lation might well never occur. In the same sense, 
the Juveni~e Court would be punishing these chil-
dren by depriving them of the loving care of their 
natural parents for a possible future violation 
of the law by these children which violation might 
well never occur. To say that the clear-and-pre-
sent-danger rule can be applied to clothe the 
Juvenile Court with such overriding power, is to 
say that the inherent right of an American citizen to 
have a. particular faith in God and to teach that 
faith to his children in his Qwn home exists only 
so long as his concept of God's Word agrees with 
the concept of a particular judge as to what God's 
Word is. To say such and to enforce that idea 
by the power of the courts is to do so in vio-
lation of both the Constitution of Utah and the 
Constitution of The United States of America. 
Point 2. The Decree ,:~nd Judgment operates 
to take the custody of children from their natural 
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parents without due process of law, the court hav-
ing no jurisdiction to enter the Decree and Judg-
ment which it has entered, all of which constitutes 
the taking of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law in violation of the 14th Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the The United States 
of America and Section 7 of Article I of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
The right of parents to the care and custody 
of their children is a right protected from in-
fringement by the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution of The United States 
of America set out in the argument under Point 1 
above and by Section 7 of Article I of the Consti-
tution of Utah which reads as follows: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of 
law." 
A parent is entitled to the services and 
earnings of his minor child. When the child is 
taken from its parent by a decree of a court act-
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ing in excess of its jurisdiction the parent is 
deprived of property without due process of law. 
Mr. Vernier in 4 AMERICAN FAMILY LAW ~ 232, 
page 20 says: 
"The father is clearly entitled to the 
services and e~rnings of the child under the 
common law. There is some dispute in the 
cases as to whether the surviving mother is 
so entitled, but the weight of authority and 
better opinion confers the right upon her. 
As indicated above, the cases often fallacious-
ly base the rule on a so-called reciprocal 
duty of support in the parent. A more logical 
basis of the rule is that the parents are 
entitled to the child's earnings in order to 
better enable them to control him." 
There have been statutory variations made on 
the rule, and these are pointed out by Mr. Vernier; 
however, the right of the parents to the earnings 
of their minor children, with certain protections 
for the children, is well established in all juris-
dictions. 
This question was dealt with in BROOKS v. 
DeWITT, Tex. Civ. App., 178 S.W. (2d) 718, (1944), 
wherein the court spoke of due process and the 
property right of parents over their children, 
48 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as follows: 
"While the State undoubtedly has an in-
terest in the status of infants within its 
jurisdiction and may prescribe by statute 
reasonable tests and standards from which it 
may be determined whether or not parents by 
neglect or unsocial conduct have in fact lost 
their rights in and to a child, it is also 
true that the rights of parents over their 
children are in the nature of property rights 
and protected by the due process clause of the 
Four+.eenth Amendment · of the United States 
Constitution.n 
The issue was considered by the California 
Court in ODELL v. LUTZ, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 104, 177 
P (2d) 628, (1947), where the court also went into 
the question of the right of the state to interfere 
with parental direction of children. The court 
said: 
"Although the rights of parenthood are 
not absolute, but subject to the superior right 
of the state to intervene and protect the child 
against abuse of parental authority, the state 
may not constitutionally interfere with the 
natural liberty of parents to direct the up-
bringing of their children ••• The supremacy 
of the mother and father in their own home in 
regard to the control of their children is 
generally recognized. 'It is said that the 
natural rights of a father ••• are greater than 
those which any guardian can have ••• The legal 
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obligations of parenthood include the duties 
of support, of care and protection, and of 
education. As compensation therefor, the 
laV-' recognizes certain rights in the parent ••• 
So fundamental are the rights of parenthood 
that infringements thereof have been held to 
constitute an encroachment on the personal 
liberty of the parent forbidden by the Consti-
tution ••• • 39 Am. Jur. 593, 594." 
This right of parents to the care and custody 
of their minor children is a natural right which 
far transcends our concept of property. It is 
such a right that it will be interfered with by 
courts only for the gravest reasons, 
which reason~do not exist here. The extent of 
this right and the power and position of the state 
with reference to its minor children will be more 
thoroughly dealt with in the discussion immediately 
hereinafter following under Point 3 with reference to 
the doctrine of parens patriae. 
Point 3. Section 55-10-35, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, under which the Juvenile Court in 
subparagraph 5 of its Decree and Judgment purports 
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to act in stating that the execution of its judg-
ment shall not be stayed pending an appeal, is un-
constitutional if it can be invoked in a case like 
the case at bar in that, it is a violation of due 
process of law and an overextension of the doctrine 
of parens patriae, under which doctrine Juvenile 
Court statutes must be justified. 
In the taking of custody of children from 
their parents the state takes away the liberty 
of both the parent and the child. Such action is 
quite as serious as any criminal matter. The pro-
tections afforded those deprived of such liberty 
in order to meet due process requirements should 
be no less than those afforded the accused criminal. 
There are many instances in the law when bail is 
granted to persons convicted of crimes in the lower 
courts pending appeal of their convictions. 
Section 55-10-35 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
is as follows: 
"Stay pending appeal -- • An appeal, 
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with or without bail, in the case of a child, 
shall not suspend the order of the juvenile 
court, nor shall it discharge the child from 
the custody of the juvenile court, or of the 
person, institution, or agency to whose care 
such child shall have been committed, unless 
the juvenile court shall so order." 
Such a statute could never have been intended 
by the legislature to have been invoked in a case 
like the case at bar. By its very wording, it im-
plies that it is meant to apply only in a case in 
which bail might be appropriate. When anyone thinks 
of bail, he thinks of a criminal violation. These 
children have not been accused of any criminal 
violation; they were not taken into custody for 
anything which they may have done. The setting 
of bail in a case such as this would have been mani-
festly absurd. Even if it be held that the section 
was intended to apply only when a minor has been 
apprehended for, accused of, and tried by the juve-
nile court for an act which, had it been done by an 
adult, would be denominated a bailable offense, 
it is doubtful if the statute is constitutional 
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since the power of the juvenile court to refuse 
the stay depends upon nothing, so far as the 
statute is concerned. The court seems to be given 
unlimited discretion, and the statute would almost 
permit the juvenile court to refuse the stay with-
out reason, regardless of the circumstances of the 
case or the offense involved. Such authority would 
seem to go too far, especially in juvenile matters, 
since the duty of juvenile courts under the doc-
trine of parens patriae is to administer justice 
tempered with mercy. 
Irreparable harm can be done children by tak-
ing them forcibly from their mother's protecting 
arms, even for one day. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that these children were forcibly taken 
from their mother. Whether irreparable harm was 
done to these children by such act only the passage 
of time will disclose. Perhaps time will heal 
those wounds as it has healed many others, but a 
youthful im0ression of justice or injustice is 
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very seldom changed, except to be deepened, by time. 
When should a juvenile judge grant a stay? 
The statute certainly doesn't say. The juvenile 
judge is given no standard to go by, certainly not 
a standard set by the statute. 
The Juvenile Judge of Washington County, Utah 
in this case in Subparagraph 5 of his Decree and 
Judgment decided that "the judgment shall not be 
stayed in the event of any appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Utah." Why did the court see fit to in-
clude this statement in its Decree and Judgment? 
The matter was heard on March 20, 1954. The 
decision was rendered on May 11, 1954. Conditions 
were so bad in this home that the court had already 
left the children there almost two months before 
making his decision and was willing to let them 
remain there indefinitely if the parents would only 1 1 
take and subscribe and file the oath which the court 
prescribed. Could those conditions have been so 
bad that upon the parents• failure to agree to the 
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conditions set by the court these children would 
have been greatly harmed by leaving them with their 
mother pending an appeal to this court from a decis-
ion which seems to have been one of first impression? 
But the statute does not require the court to exer-
cise any discretion. The statute can only be cons-
titutional under the doctrine of parens patriae 
if it implies that the court must exercise reason-
able discretion. If the statute does so imply, 
there is no evidence that any reasonable discretion 
was used by the court in this case. 
The right of the courts to interfere with 
parental upbringing of their children, particular-
ly with reference to their religious instruction, 
is certainly sufficiently nebulous as to appraise 
any court that in so interfering he may well be 
mistaken in his concept of his authority. The 
case of DENTON v. JAMES, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 
307, 12 A.L.R. 1146 (1920) goes into the matter 
of the power of the state in this regard in a 
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manner well-suited to appraise anyone of the need 
for great discretion in these matters. In that 
opinion the Kansas court reasoned, in part, as fol-
lows: 
" ••• Any court will say that the criterion of 
parental right to custody of a child is welfare 
of the child. The criterion, however, is not 
always judiciously applied. Sometimes it is 
declared that the rearing of children is a 
function which the state delegates to parents, 
and which it may resume at will, for its welfare, 
through the welfare of the child. The rearing 
of children is not in fact a function delegated 
by the state to the citizen, any more than the 11 
begetting of children is a delegated state 
function, and the theory of government recog-
nized by the declaration is responsible for 
absolutism in its most tyrannical form. The 
theory is expressly repudiated by the first 
two sections of the Bill of Rights of this 
state: 
11. All men are possessed of equal and 
inalienable natural rights, among which are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
12. All political power is inherent in 
the people, and all free governments are founded 
on their authority, and are instituted for their 
equal protection and benefit •••• • 
"Gen. Stato 1915 S~ 105, 106. 
"Man has no higher right or interest or 
happiness than that for which the words 'family' 
and 'home' stand. Very often it is said, with 
a touch of derision, that a child is not a 
chattel,anda parent has no property in his child 
giving him right to custody, which is very true. 
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The interest which a parent has in the nurture 
of his mm offspring, and in nearness to 
them for that purpose, lies in a different 
plane from that occupied by property; it 
transcends property. On the child's side, 
it has no higher welfare than to be raised 
by their parents, and free government is 
instituted for the protection and benefit of 
parenthood as one of the natural rights which 
the citizen possesses. Acting on these prin-
ciples, this court holds that welfare of a 
child is best subserved by leaving it with 
its natural guardian until it is demonstrated 
that the parent is unfit to discharge the 
duties which are correlative to his right. 
Then, and not until then, does his right yield, 
The latest decision on the subject was made 
in March of this year, in the case of Crews 
v. Sheldon, 106 Kan. 438, 186 Pac. 498. Prev-
ious decisions are collated in the opinion. 
" ••• Section 7 of the Bill of Rights of 
this state reads as follows: 
'The right to worship God according to 
the dictates of conscience shall never he 
infringed, nor shall any person be compelled 
to attend or support any form of worship; 
nor shall any control of or interference with 
the rights of conscience be permitted, nor 
any preference be given by law to any religious 
establishmeHt or mode of worship ••• ' Gen. 
Stat. 1915 s 111. 
"In the case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 
679, 20 L. Ed. 666, the Supreme Court of the 
United States enunciated a principle which 
is applicable here, as it was in the contro-
versy under decision: 
1 In this country the full and free right 
to entertain any religious belief, to practice 
any religious principle, and to teach any re-
ligious doctrine \vhich does not violate the 
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laws of morality and property, and which does 
not infringe personal rights, is conceded to 
all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed 
to the support of no dogma ••• • 13 Wall. 728, 
20 L. Ed. 666. 
"Aside from limitations of the general 
character indicated, the courts have no author-
ity over that part of a child's training which 
consists in religious discipline, and in a dis-
pute relating to custody, religious views afford 
no ground for depriving a parent of custody who 
is otherwise qualifiedon 
Another case which throws light upon this sub-
ject, as well as upon the matter considered under 
Point 4, infra, is a case well-seasoned with age, 
THE PEOPLE ex rel Ve TURNER, 55 Ill. 280, 8 Am. 
Rep. 645 (1820). This case involved committment 
of a 16 year old boy to the Reform School of the 
City of Chicago as one who was ndestitute of proper 
parental care, and growing up in mendicancy, ignor-
ance, idleness or vice". The court held the statute 
unconstitutional. It said: 
"What is proper parental care? The best 
and kindest parents v.rould differ, in the attempt 
to solve the question. No two scarcely agree; 
and when we consider the watchful supervision, 
which is so unremitting over the domestic affairs 
of others, the conclusion is forced upon us, 
that there is not a child in the land who could 
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not be proved, by two or more witnesses, to 
be in this sad condition •••• In our solici-
tude to form youth for the duties of civil 
life, we should not forget the rights which 
inhere both in parents and children. The 
principle of the absorption of the child in, 
and its complete submission to the despotism 
of, the State, is wholly inadmissible in the 
modern civilized world. 
''The parent has the right to the care, 
custody and assistance of his child. The 
duty to maintain and protect it, is a prin-
ciple of natural law. He may even justify 
an assault and battery, in the defense of 
his children, and uphold them in their law 
suits. Thus the law recognizes the power of 
parental affection, and excuses acts, which, 
in the absence of such a relation would be 
punished. Another branch of parental duty, 
strongly inculcated by writers on natural 
law, is the education of children. To aid 
in the performance of these duties, and en-
force obedience, parents have authority over 
them. The municipal law should not disturb 
this relation, except for the strongest 
reasons. The ease with which it can be dis-
rupted under the laws in question; the 
slight evidence required, and the informal 
mode of procedure, make them conflict with 
the natural right of the parent. Before 
any abridgment of the right, gross miscon-
duct or almost total unfitness on the part 
of the parent, should be clearly proved. 
This power is an emanation from God, and 
every attempt to infringe upon it, except 
from dire necessity, should be resisted in 
all well governed States. 'In this country, 
the hope of the child, in respect to its 
education and future advancement, is mainly 
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dependent upon the father; for this he 
struggles and toils through life; the desire 
of its accomplishment operating as one of 
the most powerfUl incentives to industry and 
thrift. The violent abruption of this rela-
tion would not only tend to wither these 
motives to action, but necessarily, in time, 
alienate the father's natural affections. "' 
A very well reasoned case by the Colorado 
court deals with the position of the state as 
regards interference with the relationship of 
children to their natural parents. In NELSON v. 
MITCHELL, 48 Colo. 454, 111 Pac. 21, 30 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 507 (1910), the father of the minor child 
having died, her divorced mother, who had re-
married, sought custody by habeas corpus from 
the paternal grandparents of her daughter. In 
awarding the custody to the mother, the court 
considered the general problems and legal 
theories involved as follows: 
"··· But as governments should never 
interfere with the natural rights of man, 
except only when it is essential for the 
good of society, the state recognizes and 
enforces the right which nature gives to 
parents to the custody of their mm chil-
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dren, and only supervenes with its sovereign 
power when the necessities of the case require 
it. The experience of man has demonstrated 
that the best development of a young life is 
within the sacred precincts of a home, the 
members of which are bound together by ties 
entwined through 1bone of their bone and 
flesh of their flesh'; that it is such homes 
and under such influences that the sweetest, 
purest, noblest, and most attractive qualities 
of human nature, so essential to good citizen-
ship, are best nurtured and grow to wholesome 
fruition; that, when a state is based and 
builqed upon such homes, it is strong in 
patriotism, courage, and all the elements of 
the best civilization. Accordingly these 
recurring facts in the experience of man re-
sulted in a presumption establishing prima 
facie that parents are in every way qualified 
to have the care, custody, and control of 
their own offspring, and that their welfare 
and interests are best subserved under such 
control. Thus, by natural law, by common 
law, and, likewise, the statutes of this 
state, the natural parents are entitled to 
the custody of their minor children, except 
when they are unsuitable persons to be in-
trusted with their care, control, and edu-
cation, or when some exceptional circum-
stances appear which render such custody in-
imicable to the best interests of the child. 
"In Re Neff, 20 Wash. 652, 56 Pac. 383, 
384, it is said: The father 'has the natural 
and legal right to the custody and control of 
the children, unless so completely unfit from 
duties that the welfare of the children them-
selves imperatively demanded another dispo-
sition of their custody.' In Miller v. 
Wallace, 76 Ga. 479, 486, 2 Am. St. Rep. 48, 
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it is said, 'Prima facie, the right of custody 
of an infant is in the father; and when this 
right is resisted, upon the ground of his un-
fitness for the trust, or other cause, a 
proper regard to the sanctity of the parental 
relation will require that the objection be 
sustained by clear and satisfactory proofs.' 
A clear and strong case 'must be made to sus-
tain an objection to the father's right.' 
And in McKercher v. Green, supra, the doc-
trine is announced that, save in exceptional 
cases, where it is clear the welfare of the 
child demands otherwise, the parents' right 
to the custody is paramount, and should be 
recognized. In United States v. Green, 
3 Mason 482, 485, Fed. Cas. No. 15256, the 
court, speaking through Justice Story, after 
declaring that, in a general sense, the right 
of the father to have the custody of his in-
fant child is certain, continues: 'But this 
is not on account of any absolute right of 
the father, but for the benefit of the in-
fant, the law presumes it to be for its in-
terest to be under the nurture and care of 
his natural protector, both for maintenance 
and e,duca tion. 1 The rule announced in 29 
Cyc • Law & Proc. p. 1603, is that 1 the ex-
istence of circumstances which would deprive 
the parent of the right to custody of the 
child, such as unfitness, inability to care 
for it, or relinquishment of the parental 
right of custody, will not be presumed, but 
must be proved by the person opposing the 
parent's right.' It is also there announced 
that the place selected by a parent for the 
care and support of his children is presumed 
suitable, and a person claiming otherwise has 
the burden of proof. 
'~e are firmly of the opinion that in 
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all cases of this character the presumption 
is that the parents are fit and suitable 
persons to be intrusted with the care of 
their minor children, and the interests and 
welfare of such children are best subserved 
when under such care and control; that such 
presumption is like unto the presumption of 
innocence in a criminal case,--ever present, 
throughout the controversy, until overcome 
by the most solid and substantial reasons, 
established by plain and certain proofs. 
Indeed, this presumption is essential to the 
maintenance of society, for without it man 
would be denaturalized, the ties of family 
broken, the instincts of humanity stifled, 
and one of the strongest incentives to the 
propagation and continuance of the human 
race destroyed... In such proceedings the 
power to make orders touching the care and 
custody of minor children must be held to be 
limited to the conditions and circumstances 
existing at the time such orders are made. 
The court cannot then anticipate what may 
possibly thereafter happen, and provide for 
such future contingencies." 
The Wisconsin court considered this problem, 
as well as the important question of due process, 
in LOCHER v. VENUS, 177 Wis. 588, 188 N.W. 613, 
24 A.L.R. 403 (1922). The court in considering 
the taking of children from their parents by the 
state, touched upon the most serious nature of 
such action, as follows: 
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"The unit of the state is the individual, 
its foundation the family. To protect the 
unit in his constitutionally guaranteed right 
to form and preserve the family is one of the 
basic principles for which organized govern-
ment is established. Cooley, Torts, 3 d. 
ed. p. 27. 
11Th~t natural parenthood implies both 
substantial responsibilities and gives sub-
stantial rights needs no discussion. That 
wilful neglect to perform the one may proper-
ly result in the forfeiture of the other is 
also not open to debate, and not here for 
consideration. 
"A natural affection between the parents 
and offspring, though it may be nought but a 
refined animal instinct and stronger from the 
parent down than from the child up, has al-
ways been recognized as an inherent, natural 
right, for the protection of which, just as 
much as for the protection of the rights of 
the individual to life, liberty, and pursuit 
of happiness, our government is formed. We 
trust that it will never become the estab-
lished doctrine that the state shall say to 
r the parents, and particularly to the mother, 
--she who doth travail, and in great pain 
bring forth her child, and after labor doth 
rejoice that the child is born,--that there 
is but a mere privilege, and not a right, to 
subsequent affection, comfort, and pride of 
and in such child ••• 
11If a man's money shall not be legally 
taken away from him save by due process of 
law, much less shall his child. We do not 
deem it necessary to base this decision upon 
or dwell at any length upon such possible 
sordid, because material, grounds for our 
conclusion, but rest it upon the natural 
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right of parenthood, a far finer and higher 
quality, and for that reason more sacredly 
to be upheld. 
"The normal man and woman who have exer-
cised their inherent right to form the family 
relationship, and have brought children into 
this world, and who have not by wilful omiss-
ion or commission on their part renounced 
that relationship, cannot and ought not to 
have such relationship destroyed, even by 
attempted action in the name of the state, 
save and except through due process of law." 
Mr. Justice McReynolds in PIERCE v. SOCIETY 
OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct.571, 69 L. Ed. 
1070 (1925), a case involving private v. pub~ic 
schools, said, 
"The child is not the mere creature of 
the state; those who nurture him and direct 
his destiny have the right, coupled with the 
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations." 
It could be assumed, no doubt, that prepar-
ation for additional obligations might well include 
preparing him to meet what his parents conscientiously 
believe to be man's obligations to His Maker. 
Even when the matter of deprivation is before 
the court the doctrine of parens patriae is a 
li.mi ted one • 
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CLARK v. LYON, 82 Neb. 625, 118 N. W. 472, 
20 L.RoA. (N.S.) 171 (1908), was a case involving 
the right of a divorced father to custody of his 
children after his ex-wife's death. The court in 
speaking of the position of the state with refer-
ence to minors said, 
"The statute does not make the judges 
the guardians of all children in the state, 
with power to take them from their parents, 
so long as the latter discharge their duties 
to the best of their ability, and give them 
to strangers because such strangers may be 
better able to provide what is already well 
provided. If that were the law, it would 
soon be changed by revolution, if necessary." 
The Washington court goes into the question 
of how far a state can go in the matter of taking 
children from their parents in LOVELL v. HOUSE 
OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD, 9 Wash. 419, 37 Pac. 660. 
A widowed mother left her daughter with the de-
fendant orphanage. Later the mother's parents 
~dopted the child, demanded her from the defendants 
ind brought a habeas corpus action to obtain custody. 
rhe court held that the writ should issueo 
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In considering the question as to when children 
should be taken from their parents, the court went 
generally into the problem. The opinion by Chief 
Justice Dunbar is, in part, as follows: 
" ••• While it is true that the welfare 
of the child should be the first consideration 
of the court, yet the right of the parent is 
not to be disregarded; and it is a grave re-
sponsibility to deprive parents of the care, 
control, custody, and education of their chil-
dren because they do not came up to the stand-
ard of perfection that we have established for 
our own action in that respect. There is 
scarcely a day but that children may be seen, 
who, in the ordinary estimation are neglected, 
and of whom the popular verdict would declare 
that they would be better off, and stand a 
better chance of becoming useful members of 
society, if they were removed from the perni-
cious influence of their parents. Yet it 
would not do for that reason to interfere 
with the domestic relations, or to set up o,IT 
particular standard for the guidance of fam-
ilies in general. There is such a diversity 
of religious and social opinion, and of social 
standing and of intellectual development and 
of moral responsibility, in society at large, 
that courts must exercise great charity and 
forbea~nce for the opinions, methods, and 
practices of all different classes of society; 
and a case should be made out which is suf-
ficiently extravagant and singular and wrong 
to meet the condemnation of all decent and 
law-abiding people, without regard to religious 
belief or social standing, before a parent 
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should be deprived of the comfort or custody 
of a child. It is doubtful that the appellant 
Mrs. Lovell has n'ot been the most exemplary 
mother; that the care of her children has not 
been of that kind which would commend itself 
to many mothers. That she is a passionate 
woman, with an uncontrollable temper - coarse, 
vulgar, and pugnacious - is evident from the 
record. But if every coarse, vulgar, and 
passionate woman were deprived of the custody 
of her children, our orphan asylums would be 
filled to overflowing; and if every man who 
is given to brutalizing himself by the excess-
ive use of intoxicants, and by other debasing 
habito, were to be deprived of the custody of 
his children, the said institutions would be 
found altogether inadequate. Even immorality of 
the mother is not always a sufficient reason 
for depriving her of the custody of her child. 
It is the universal holding of the courts, and 
in many states is made a provision of the stat-
ute, that the mother of an illegitimate child, 
in the absence of special reasons, is entitled 
to its custcdy, and of course the fact of ille-
gitimacy is proof of the mother's immorality. 
The maternal instinct can generally be relied 
upon to protect the child far better than 
strangers, who act simply from a cold and un-
sympathetic feeling of duty to society. Of 
course, when it becomes apparent that nature's 
appeal to the parental heart meets with no 
response, and a parent has become so brutalized 
and lost to the promptings of nature that she 
is willing to sacrifice either the physical or 
moral well-being of her children to the grat-
ification of her own debased propensities or 
vicious habits, it becomes the imperative duty 
of the court to reach forth its hand for the 
protection of the children. But, as we have 
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before said, we do not think the result in 
this case shows a necessity for judicial 
interference; and, even though it may appear 
that three years ago the mother was not a 
competent person to maintain control of this 
child, the difficulties then alleged to exist 
have now passed away. Hence, the necessity 
of separating the mother and child has ceased 
to exist." 
Another case of note on this point is BRYANT 
Vo BROW~, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 60 A.L.R. 
1325 (1928). The court upheld a committment of 
a minor to the industrial school but in doing so 
announced the general rule with reference to the 
taking of children from their parents, as follm.rs 
(p. 1331 A. Lo R.) 
"As long as parents properly exercise 
their duty, under their natural rights, to 
rear, educate, and control their children, 
their right t.o do so may not be interfered \·Ji th 
solely because some other person or some other 
institution might be deemed better suited for 
that purpose. The children of the poor can-
not be taken from them, and awarded to the 
rich or to some rich and powerful institution, 
merely because such person or such institution 
might, in the judgment of the court, do a 
better part by the child than the natural 
parents. But where the parents fail to per-
form their natural duty to so rear and educate 
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the child as to make it a useful, intelligent, 
and moral being, but permit it to go unrestrained 
and to qecome vicious in its habits and prac-
tices, and a menace to the rest of society, 
the state as parens patriae of all children, 
may assert its power and apply the curative, 
so as to prevent injury to the child and to 
society by the negligent and wrongful conduct 
of the parents in failing to exercise the 
proper control and restraint over the child 
in its tendencies." 
Anderson, J., dissenting to the decision (p. 
1341, A.L.R.) states: 
11\fuat has become of one of the fundamental 
principles of our government, -that the people 
who are the least governed are the best governed? 
When the state undertakes to do too much for 
the people, the result is they do too little 
for themselves - they rely on the state. By 
the statute here involved the state enters 
the precinct of the home, and says to the 
parents of the child, "Although you are doing 
the best you can to rear your child properly, 
you are making a failure of it, and the state 
is going to tmdertake the job." If the state 
~q.n go that far, -vrhy not go a step further, and 
say by law that only those who are fit accord-
ing to a moral, intellectual, and property 
standard fixed by the state, shall marry and 
bring children into the world? 
"The companionship and services of their 
children are a valuable property right given 
their parents both by the laws of nature and 
by the laws of the state. Like any other prop-
erty right, it cannot be arbitrarily taken 
away from them by the state. To take such a 
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property right away, the state must show the 
parents have done something to forfeit it. 
Othenrise they would be deprived of their 
right in violation of the due process pro-
visions of the federal and state Consti-
tutions." 
The doctrine of parens patriae is not one giv-
ing juvenile courts unlimited powers. Neither do 
the states have unlimited powers under this doctrine. 
Section 55-10-35, Utah Code Anno,, 1953, far exceeds 
the scope of the doctrine if it confers on the 
juvenile courts the indiscretionate power which it 
seems to confer by its \vords. If the court can 
imply the discretionate restriction into the section, 
then certainly the Juvenile Court of Washington 
County, Utah exceeded the bounds of discretion given 
it under the doctrine of parens patriae in invok-
ing this power under the facts of the case at bar. 
Point 4. Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Anno-
ta ted, 195 3, under \-Thich the Juvenile Court in 1. 
of its Conclusions of Law finds the children 
"neglected children" is unconstitutional, in that 
it is vague and uncertain. 
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Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 is, 
as follows: 
" ••• The words 'neglected child' include: 
"A child who is abandoned by his parent, 
guardian or custodian. 
ttA child who lacks proper parental care 
by reason of fault or habits of the parent, 
guardian or custodian. 
"A child whose parent, guardian or cus-
todian neglects or refuses to provide proper 
or necessary subsistence, education, medical 
or surgical care or other care necessary for 
his health, morals or well-being. 
"A child whose parent, guardian or custo-
dian neglects or refuses to provide the snec-
ial care made necessary by his mental condi-
tion. 
"A child who is found in a disreputable 
place or who associates with vagrant, vicious 
or immoral persons. 
"A child who engages in an occupation 
or is in a situation dangerous to life or 
limb or injurious to the health or morals 
of himself or others." 
What is the meaning of the words na child 
whose parent ••• neglects or refuses to provide 
proper or necessary ••• other care necessary for 
his health, morals or vrell-being,"? Finding of 
Fact 17, 18 and 19 and Conclusions of Law 1 and 
2 taken in conjunction with Finding of Fact 16, 
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to wit, "that there was no evidence that any of 
the children were destitute and without proper 
sustenance, clothing or medical care," indicate 
that the court either contradicted Finding of 
Fact 16 in Finding of Fact 18 where it said the 
parents "failed and neglected to provide for said 
children the proper maintenance, care, training 
and education contemplated and required by both 
law and morals", or it has placed its deprivation 
of custody solely on the grounds that these parents 
are raising these children in an immoral environ-
ment or in such a way as to make the children grow 
up to be immoral. 
What is the standard of immorality used by 
the court? From the conditions set by the Decree 
and Judgment and the oath prescribed by the court 
it might well appear that the judgment of immoral-
ity comes from the fact that it appears that these 
children are so situated that they are exposed 
to the religious philosophy which their parents 
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believe to be the Word of God. Such a religious 
philosophy has been held by the Federal District 
Court for the District of Utah not to be immoral. 
That philosophy is found in Section 132 of DOCTRINE 
and COVENANTS of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints, all the material in which book 
is looked upon by over 1,ooo,ooo people through-
out the world, the majority being in tre United 
States, as being the Word of God. Certainly the 
court is not saying that any part of the Word of 
God is immoral. The rest of the Philosophy, in 
view especially of the emphasis placed upon it 
in the questions propounded to the witnesses at 
the hearing with reference to it, may be said to 
be found in Truth Magazine. The editorial from 
that magazine quoted by Judge Symes in the case 
of UNITED STATES v. BARLOW, 56 F. Supp. 795, 
(1944), is quoted in this argument under Point 1, 
supra. It was looked upon by that court as 
typical of what might be found on the subject in 
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that publication. 
The Barlow case on the question of morals 
here involved is important enough to deserve a 
detailed presentation. 
In tbat case the court was dealing with an 
indictment under the mailing laws which charged 
that 11 TRUTH 11 magazine was "obscene, lewd, or 
lascivious" and "of an indecent charactern. This 
was felt to be a necessary incident of certain 
editorials in that publication which "simply ad-
vocated the restoration of •celestial or plural 
marriage', stating that the Lord has revealed the 
principle thereof." The court, Judge Symes sitting, 
quoted the editorial set out hereinabove and said 
on page 796: 
"A careful reading of the editorial dis-
closes no obscene or filthy word of expression 
of lewd suggestion is used or contained therein. 
It is restrained and nothing more than an ar-
gument in favor of a practice that for many 
years was a tenet of the Mormon Church, until 
abolished as a condition of Utah to Statehood. 
I cannot see how any word or sentence in these 
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editorials submitted to the court can be denom-
inated as lascivious, or of a nature to excite 
erotic feelings or thoughts in the mind of 
the ordinary reader, or as tending to deprave 
public morals, or lead to impure purposes or 
practices." 
On page 797 the court said, 
"A reading of the publication here in-
volved forces us to the same conclusion. 
As stated, it is nothing more than advocacy 
of a certain practice that was once part of 
the religion of the Mormon Church, and which 
this group of defendants still advocates. 
There is nothing in it that comes within the 
language of the Swearingen case, or which 
tends to corrupt and debauch the minds and 
morals of those in whose hands it might fall. 
"The court takes judicial notice that 
the Morman Church for many years advocated 
polygamy, and in doing so used the mails to 
disseminate its literature, advocating 
'celestial or plural marriages'. Such a use 
of the mails has continued for many years 
without molestation, and has never before been 
questioned. In the interpretation of a doubt-
ful and ambiguous statute - a uniform admin-
istrative practice by the authorities in re-
spect thereto over a considerable period of 
time carries weight with the court, especially 
where, as here, thousands of good citizens 
sincerely and honestly believe in it as part 
of their religion. 
"It was quite natural that when the Con-
gress forbade plural marriages and the church 
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agreed to submit to those laws many of the 
followers of the Morman faith felt they could 
not conscientiously and sincerely change their 
beliefs in the face of what they considered 
the direct command of God to the contrary. 
"In conclusion, it might be said that the 
natural reaction to reading a publication 
setting forth that polygamy is essential to 
salvation is one of repugnance and does not 
tend to increase sexual desire or impure 
thoughts. We also bear in mind that one 
cannot pick up a national magazine, or go to 
the theatre or movie without being confronted 
with illustrations and advertisements that 
tend more to incite sexual desire than do any 
of the publications in this magazine that 
have been called to our attention. In fact 
sex excitement is a selling point of innumer-
able publications and advertisements that pass 
without comment or prosecution." 
It is to be emphasized that the court said on 
page 797 "There is nothing in it that comes within 
the language of the Swearingen case, or which tends 
to corrupt and debauch the minds and morals of those 
in whose hands it might fall." 
Judge Symes apparently did not feel that this 
religious philosophy was immoral or that it would 
corrupt the mind and morals of anyone, but the 
Juvenile Judge of Washington County, Utah appar-
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ently felt otherwise. A third person might have 
yet another opinion, and so a fourth, and so on 
ad infinitum. A hundred different people are quite 
likely to have a hundred different conceptions of 
what is moral and what is immorale 
The section of the statute in question gives 
no statutory definition of the term involved. In 
so failing, it might well be held to have left the 
question of what is proper or necessary moral care 
completely up to the juvenile judge. This would 
seem to be an improper delegation of legislative 
power. If it is not improper delegation then the 
court should look to the cases for guidance. Al-
though it may not be binding authority on the Utah 
courts, the opinion of the Federal District Judge, 
District of Utah, in a matter in which the issue 
was involved would surely be looked upon as most 
highly persuasive authority, especially so in view 
of the fact that the Supreme Court of the United 
States dismissed, without opinion, an appeal by 
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The United States from the Barlow decision of the 
Federal District Court, District of Utah, at 323 
u.s. 805, 65 s.ct. 25, L. Ed. 642. 
In the case of MUSSER v. UTAH in the United 
States Supreme Court, set out hereinabove in the 
argument under Point 1 the opinion of Mr. Justice 
Jackson on the use of the term "injurious to public 
morals" in the statute involved indicates the 
Justice's distrust of such broad wording without 
limitation or definition. 
In the rehearing of this case in the Supreme 
Court of Utah in STATE v. MUSSER, - Utah - , 223 
P. (2d) 193 (1950), the court held the statute 
"void for vagueness and uncertainty under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution." 
Mr. Justice Wade in the opinion of the court at 
page 194 reasoned as follows: 
"The argument before this court has 
developed no reason why we should believe 
that the legislature intended, in using this 
language, that it should be limited to a 
meaning less broad than the words therein used 
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would indicate in their ordinary sense. No 
language in this or any other statute of 
this state or other law thereof or any his-
torical fact or surrounding circumstance con-
nected with the enactment of this statute 
has been pointed to as indicating that the 
legislature intended any limitation thereon 
other than that expressed on the face 
of the words used. We are therefore unable 
to place a construction on these words which 
limits their meaning beyond the general 
meaning. The conviction of the defendants 
thereunder cannot be upheld." 
The same indictment given the words in that 
case should be applied to the words called into 
question herein in Section 55-10-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. The words "necessary for his 
health, morals or well-beingtt are certainly 
susceptible to a multiplicity of interpretations 
limited only qy the number of people called upon 
to interpret them. 
Point 5. The Findings of Fact 14, 17, 18, 
and 19 are not supported by the evidence, and 
said Findings of Fact being essential to the 
Conclusions of Law entered by the court, said 
Conclusions of Law are, therefore, not based upon 
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the evidence before the court, and the Judgment 
and Decree based upon said Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is, therefore, erroneous. 
Finding of Fact 14 is as follows: 
"That said parents, Leonard and Vera 
Johnson Black, have at no time counseled 
or advised any of their children to abide 
by the laws of Utah regarding polygamy, but 
on the contrary by their (the Parents') own 
conduct and example in living polygamy and 
by associating themselves with a religious 
group whose members practice and advocate 
polygamy have encouraged their children to 
become polygamis~when they become of marriage-
able age." 
This finding of fact seems to be at variance 
with the testimony produced at the hearing. 
Mr. Black testified, on page 38 of the trans-
cript of testimony, under questioning by the court 
as follows: 
"Question - Did you encourage your daughters 
to make the marriages they did? 
Answer- No, sir." 
On page 43 under questioning by Mr. Nelson, 
as follows: 
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"Question - Have you generally and has 
your wife, tried to teach 
your children the necessity 
of obedience to the law? 
Answer - Yes. We have been strict on 
obeying the laws, stealing 
and so forth." 
On pages 44 and 45 in answer to a question by 
the court to this effect: " ••• I am very interested 
in knowing whether it would be your intention to 
encourage your children to comply with the laws of 
Utah regarding plural marriage and unlawful cohab-
itation or if you are going to leave it up to the 
children when they become of the age of consent 
as you say. What is it your intention to do?", 
Mr. Black answered, "I can tell them the results 
and facts, not to be law-breakers." 
The mother of the children under direct 
questioning by Mr. Nelson on page 61 answered the 
question, nWhat do you expect to teach your children 
Mrs. Black?", as follows: "I expect to teach them 
to be upright, good citizens as far as my knowledge 
goes." 
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And further on page 61 of the transcript: 
"Question - Well, then I will put it this 
way. If you feel that the 
law doe~ not adhere to your 
concept of what it should be, 
that you are free to breach 
that law and to teach your 
children to do so? 
Answer - I don't teach my children 
to do any such thing." 
On page 65 of the transcript the mother answer-
ed a question of Mr. Nelson, as follm.rs: 
"I believe in teaching the principle of 
the thing, but I am not saying I would teach 
them to practice it." 
Mr. Nelsonrs line of questioning on pages 
69 and 70 and the mother's answers to his questions 
clearly indicate that she has not counseled and 
advised her children to enter into a plural re-
lationship. In fact, her answers indicates that 
she feels the children are all too young to discuss 
the subject with them. 
On page 77 of the transcript the mother re-
plied to the following question by the court: 
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"And how will you counsel them?", as follows: "I 
could counsel them to obey the laws of the land, 
if they felt it was their duty to go otherwise why 
that was their life." 
On page 81 Orson Black was questioned by the 
court, as follows: "Has the subject of plural 
marriage ever been discussed between you and either 
of your parents, Orson?" Orson replied: "No, Sir." 
There is ample testimony throughout the record 
of this hearing showing that these parents have 
actively encouraged their children to obey all 
the laws. That seems to be good parental advice. 
It is not customary for parents to go down the 
line of the statutes and affirmatively counsel 
their children to obey each oneo The children 
of these parents are not going to be advised by 
these parents to go out and break the law. There 
is ample testimony to this effect. That they might 
be taught the principle of celestial or plural 
marriage, would not be a violation of any law on 
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the part of the teacher. If the teacher after 
teaching this principle were then to say to his 
listener "Now, go out and enter into a plural 
marriage relationship. 11 and the listener then 
did so in violation of law, the teacher would 
then also be guilty of violating the law. There 
is no evidence that this has ever happened on 
the part of these parents, and certainly it has 
never happened in the case of the children before 
the Juvenile Court in this matter. 
There is a conclusion in Finding of Fact 14 
that the parents' example is going to lead these 
children into polygamy when they reach marriageable 
age. The court in that finding refers to the 
parents' "own conduct and example in living in 
polygamy. n Yet the court in Finding of Fact 6, 
in effect, found that they were not living in 
polygamy at the time of the hearing and had not 
been so living since July 24, 1953. The Findings 
of Fact do not square on these points. These 
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parents are not now living in polygamy; yet the 
court says the example of their living will en-
courage their children to become polygamists. 
Of course, Finding of Fact 14 also finds 
that these parents "by associating themselves 
with a religious group whose members practice 
and advocate polygamy11 encourage their children 
to become polygamists. In other words, the as-
sociation is what will lead these children to 
become polygamists. Even a cursory reading of 
the history of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints prior to 1890 quickly shows 
that even when that church actively encouraged 
its members to enter polygamy a very small per-
centage of that church's membership were in the 
plural marriage relationship. The association 
was not sufficient to encourage the great majority 
of latter day saints in the days prior to 1890. 
What is the justification for concluding that 
association is going to do it in this day? 
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It would seem, of course, that such a conclusion 
was a necessary adjunct to there being any logic 
in the Findings of Fact 17, 18, and 19 that these 
children are being raised in an immoral environ-
ment, that their parents have neglected to provide 
them with proper moral training and that, therefore, 
the court is justified in taking the custody of 
these children from their parents. However nec-
essary the conclusion may be for the sake of logic, 
it is certainly not a finding of fact supportable 
by the testimony taken at this hearing or by re-
ference to any history of the situation, which 
point of history is a matter of very common know-
ledge in Utah and of which the court could be 
presumed to be aware. 
Finding of Fact 17 is "That the home of 
Leonard Black and Vera Johnson Black at Short 
Creek, Utah, is an immoral environment for the 
rearing of said children." Such a finding is 
not in accord with the testimony presented at 
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the hearing. 
Mr. Lauritzen in his testimony at page 97 
of the transcript stated as to the people at 
Short Creek: 
11 I would say that I have never known, 
and I have been around a great deal, a more 
industrious people, a more honest a more 
reliable people in every way I can think of 
\vhere I would judge a character for integrity 
and decency I would say these people in Short 
Creek average higher than any people I know. 
And on page 97 as to the character of Leonard 
Black: 
"I \vould say that he is as: moral a 
character as I know, that is in the way of 
decency and clean-mindedness.n 
And on page 97 with reference to the mother 
of these children: 
"I must say that I know very little about 
Vera or her home life and anything in regard 
to her life at all, but I would say my im-
pression of Vera is that she is a very clean, 
fine woman and that she would be devoted to 
her children." 
And on page 105 with reference as to whether 
the people of Short Creek were a happy people: 
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"I have never seen a happier bunch of 
people, unless it was in Harlem or down 
South where they turned themselves loose and 
sang and danced. I have often remarked to 
my wife that those children, those families 
seemed to be, from my outside standpoint, 
seemed to be the most happy people I have 
ever seen. Their lives are more wholesome 
and purposeful than any I have seen. 11 
This line of testimony was not controverted. 
A mother who is devoted to her children does 
not raise them in an immoral environment. From 
the testimony adduced Short Creek has a very moral 
environment rather than contrary. 
Finding of Fact 18 seems to state itself in 
the words of the statute, but it does not state 
something which can be supported in the record 
before the court. The record indicates that 
these are very well-trained and well-behaved 
children. If they are not being given the proper 
training from the standpoint of morals, they must 
be immoral children. Certainly a finding of 
fact to that effect could not be supported. 
If these children are not being properly trained, 
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they should show tendencies toward delinquency, 
one would think. Who would be in a better posi-
tion to observe this than their school teacher? 
Mrs. Lauritzen on page 112 of the transcript 
of testimony was asked by Mr. Knowlton, "Do these 
children show any tendencies toward delinquency?" 
She answered, "No, they are very well-behaved 
children." 
Mrs. Lauritzen's testimony as to whether 
in her opinion these children should be taken away 
from their parents and from Short Creek appears 
on page 114 of the transcript of testimony, as follows: 
"I think that little children need secur-
ity and love, and that security seems to come 
from the lovf1a they feel in the home, and it 
would be my opinion that they would surely 
lose security and gather a great deal of com-
plexes if they were taken from their homes. 
I think the exuberance and happiness they have 
when they get to school shows that there is 
love in the home. It seems other complexes 
would arise if they were taken from the home, 
they wouldn't have this love and affection.'' 
This line of testimony was not controverted. 
What it indicates is that this school teacher-mother, 
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in an excellent position to observe these children, 
felt their environment was sound, their training 
and education quite adequate, and that they should 
be left where they were. The court did not agree, 
however, with this uncontroverted testimony. 
Finding of Fact 19 follows if Findings 14, 
17, and 18 are proper. These findings are im-
proper and are not supported by the evidence and 
testimony taken at the hearing. 
Conclusions of Law must be based upon the 
Findings of Fact. Where the Findings of Fact 
necessary to support the Conclusions of Law are 
in and of themselves unsupported by evidence and 
testimony, such Conclusions of Law are erroneous, 
and the Decree and Judgment of the court entered 
upon such Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law will be reversed for error by the Supreme 
Court of the state on appeal, as this court should 
do in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, submit that the Decree and 
Judgment of the Court below is unconstitutional 
and void as contrary to provisions of the Consti-
tution of Utah and the Constitution of the United 
States of America, that the Court erred in his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that 
this Court should reverse the Decree and Judgment 
of the Court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HORA.CE J. KNOWLTON 
ROBERT J. SCHUM 
Attorneys for Appellants 
214 Tenth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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